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A NEGOTIATION PROCESS IMPLEMENTING 
THE NASH BARGAINING MODEL 
Part I 
Tokio Suzuki 
Since the mtroduction of出enoncooperative negotiation model m 
Nash (1953), quite a few authors, including Nash himself, have 
pointed out problems and proposed more general and realistic 
models Nash proved m 出esame article出atthe Nash solut10n, 
defined in Nash (1950), is the unique equilibrium of a generalized 
negotiat10n model usmg a continuous map as a payoff function. 
Another noncooperat1ve implementation of the Nash model was 
made by Rubinstein (1982), in order to get a dynamic character. 
Since the Nash model 1s a one-shot game, the negotiations may 
result in a Pareto mfenor outcome The Rubinstem model is a 
supergame of the Nash model, where the players offer an outcome 
alternately until an agreement 1s reached, and after each round there 
is some positive probability of a breakdown 
In Section 1 of this article, a general payoff set is mtroduced, on 
the basis of Smale (1974a). This配tis compact but not necessanly 
convex. From the results in Nash (1953), the set of equilibria is the 
union of the Pareto boundary points and the出reatpoint. If the 
payoff set is convex, and a mixed strategy 1s allowed, then every 
point in the payo百 setcan be obtamed as an expected payoff of 
some eqmhbrmm points. Therefore, the discuss10n can be restricted 
to pure strategies, so that the convexity does not play an important 
role. It is then proved出atunder some conditions there are a fmite 
number of extended Nash solut10ns. The proof is based on an 
mfmite dimensional vers10n of the transversahty出eorem,discussed 
in Chapter 4 of Abraham and Robbin (1967). 
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In Section 2，仕1ebasic structure of tbe Rubinstein model is briefly 
explained. The existence of an equilibrium is then proved, where the 
general payoff set 1s used A further discussion is to be made in 
another article 
1. Nash Solution with General Payoff Sets 
A payoff set Wo 1s described by C' funct10ns g1, i = 1, , n,as 
follows: 
Wo={xεWlg1(x）副， i=l,. ,n} 
Wニ［0,1］×［0,1] So Wo is compact in R', but not necessarily 
convex The following condit10ns on g, are also assumed 
A田umpt10n1 
a) g, (0) > 0,al i. 
b) If xEWo and Bx is the set of kE{l, ., n} such出atgk(x)=O, 
then the vecto四 Dg,(x), k E Bx, are linearly independent. 
a) means that OER' 1s an interior point of Wo This point will be 
defined as the threat pomt It follows from b) tbat OER is a regular 
value of g1, 1 = 1,., n.Smce W c R', Bx can contam at most two 
elements. Bx will be replaced by B, a given subset of (1, . , n}. 
Let C＇仰， R)be tbe space of C' maps from W to R. C＇仰， R)is 
endowed wi出 theC' Whitney topolo邸入 Aneighborhood Nh of the 
origin 1s defined by a continuous map h W→ R+, where R+ 1s the 
配tof strictly positive real numbers, such出at.
fEC' (W, R) belongs to Nh 
if and only if 
I f(x) Iくh(x), al xEW, 
I Df (x) Iくh(x), al xEW, and 
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I D『(x)I < h (x), al x巨w.
Since W 1s compact, h attams a maximum, so that出1stopology 
giv田 ametric. In fact, C' (W, R) with the C' Whitney topology 
becomes a Banach space 
Let G be the whole collection of g=(g,, ..剖E [C司W,R)] n satisfying 
the conditions in Assumption 1. Then it is easily verified出atG is 
open in [C司W,R)]n So G is a smooth Banach manifold. 
The structure of Wo given by gEG is studied in detail. Take any 
B and define: 
b= {xEWo[g, (x)=O, al kEB} 
From the imphcit funct10n theorem, g,-1(0), kEB, becomes a C' 
marufold of dimension one, as long as the inverse image 1s 
nonempty. Suppose that B actually consists of two elements k and 
k’. Then from b) of Assumption 1, the restriction g,[g,.-1 (0) stil has 
OER as a regular value. This means that b is a C' manifold, and 
the dimension is 2 le8s the number of elements m B. By using 
g,[ g,.-i (0), 1t is also easily seen that the tangent space of b at any 
xEb is given by the following mtersection. 
，~.Ker Dg<(x) 
ε 
Definition 1 
Take any gEG and fix B. Let f: W→ R be f: (x1, x2）トー~ X1X> 
xEb 1s called an extended Nash solution of the game descnbed by 
g, with B, if the following condition is satisfied: 
There are nonnegal!ve numbers kEB，λ片，
not al zero such出at:
λDf (x）＋三件Dg,(x）ニO
kGH 
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This is the first order condit10n of constramed maxim凹n,as 
discussed in Chapter 4 of Intriligator (1971). 
On the basis of these settings, it can be proved出atthere is an 
open and dense subset 8 of G such出atany gE 8 yields a finite 
number of the extended Nash solutions. Toward this end, the 
following C' map is constructed, where gEG and B are given, and 
非Bis the number of elements in B. 
y,, S+ (R×R開）×W ー今 R四×R'
such也at
.;,.,: （λμ＂ x）ト→
[gk (x）， λDf (x)-J;.~陣Dgk 仇）］
The subscript k ranges over B, and S+ (R×R"可isthe nonnegative 
part of the unit sphere of dimension # B.It is enough to consider a 
normalized（λ，メ,J.
Now consider Y, •. i'(O). Clearly, this is precisely the set of the 
extended Nash solutions of出egame described by g, with B. The 
domain of百九Bis compact, and the chmens10n of the domam is equal 
to that of the codomain 
Therefore, if百九shas OER四 XR' as a regular value, then the 
regular value theorem, discussed in Chapter 1 of Hirsch (1976), gives 
that和－＇（ O)can contain at most a fimte number of elements 
Concerning the existence of an extended Nash solution, the classical 
discussion in Nash (1950) would be enough. A generic prope此yof出e
fl凶te町田 isobtained by the followmg lemma 
Lemma 1 
For any B, there is an open and dense subset 8(B) of G such that 
each怯，－＇(O), g E 8 (B), is a finite配t
Proof 
Fix B, and consider the following map: 
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p:G→ C' [S+(R×R問）× W,R"B×問
such that 
p:gト→ y,•.• 
The codomain ofρis endowed with出eC' Whitney topology, so 
that it is a Banach space. G is a smooth Banach manifold. It is白en
verified thatρis a C' repr田entation.That is, the evaluation map 
ev p is C', where: 
evρG×S+(R×E門×W ＂ーR開×R'
such出at
evp (g，λ，μ >.x）ト→ρg（λ，帥，x)
Then from the discussion in Chapter 4 of Abraham and Robbin 
(1967), the whole collection of gEG such that OER問×R'is a 
regular value of ρg, is open in G. Let e (B)be the set. On the other 
hand, the C' map evρhas OER同×R'as a regular value, and G is 
田condcountable. Therefore, the results in the same chapter of 
Abraham and Robbin (1967) give that e (B) is also the countable 
mtersection of open and dense subsets of G. Smce C' [W, R) endowed 
with the C' Whitney topology satisfies the Baire property, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 of Hirsch (1976），。（B)is dense in G. 
This completes the proof. 
Since the whole collection of B is finite, the following theorem is 
obtained by taking the intersection of e (B). 
Theorem 1 
There is an open and dense subset e of G such that仕1eset of the 
extended Nash solutions of the game descnbed by gE e,is fimte 
Remark From the results in Chapter 4 of S田 uki(1987), a stability 
仕1eoremcan follow At吐1emoment, gE B isgiven and fixed 
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2. The Rubinstein Model and Some Extension 
The negotiation proce田 inRubinstem (1982), reformulated in 
Chapter 7 of van Da立une(1987), is a multi-stage game with perfect 
information, where there is some positive probability of a breakdown 
after each round. This can reflect the costs of bargammg and 
discounted payoffs. 
The number of negotiators is 2, and the breakdown probability 
BE (0,1) is given Each round 1s descnbed by the following rules, 
where Wo c R' is the payoff set, and N is出eset of natural 
numbers: 
1) In round 2t-l, tEN, player 1 proposes x= (x1,x,) EWo_ Player 
2 can either accept or reject it If accepted, player i receives 
X1, i =l, 2. 0出erwise,the game ends with probability a , 
yielding the disagreement outcome of (0, 0). With probability 
1 -a, the game proceeds to the next round. 
2) In round 2t, tE N, player 2 offers an element of Wo Player 1 
can either accept or reject 1t The rest is the same as 1). 
Suppose出atthere is a“justified”payoff vector x* = (x,*,x,*) E 
Wo, as discussed in α>apter 7 of van Damme (1987). This mearn 
出atas long as uncertainty 1s not involved, player i will never 
accept any offer less than x1*, and the amount 1s mutually regarded 
as reasonable. Furthermore, if (xλ （1-0) x,*) and ( (1ー 却が， x,*)
belong to the Pareto boundary of Wo，日1enthe negotiation will reach 
an agr田 mentin round one, with the payoff (x1て（1 0) x,*). This is 
easily verified in the following way_ Recallmg出ateach player has a 
utility function of出evon Ne凹nanntype, player 2 will not reject 
(1 -0) x,* in round 1. In round 2, player 1 will accept (1 母xλ （xよ
(1 0) x,*) in round 1 isin fact the best reply of player 1 to ( (1一品
x1*, x,*) o任eredby player 2 in round 2. At出esame time, the offer 
((1-0) x1*, x,*) by player 2 in round 2 isthe best reply of player 2 
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to (x1*, (1 母x,*)offered by player 1 in round 1. Under this 
situat10n，出ebargainmg will end. in round 1, wi出 thepayoff (x1へ
(1 品x,*).
These offers are m fact subgame perfect m 出ecorrespondmg 
round. The concept of subgame perfectness is explained in Chapter 6 
of van Damme (1987). 
The existerce of (x1へx,*)1s proved m the followmg way. Consider 
any g= (g1, . ,g,) EG such that for any xEg「1(0),Dg1 (x) is a strictly 
positive vector m R', .i= 1,. ,n From the imphc1t function theorem, 
Z「1(O) in a neighborhood Nx of x can be represented as a graph of 
a C' strictly decreasing function on "(Nxng, 1(0), whereπ：（x1, 
X2）トー → X1.Furthennore, it is not difficult to find g with出is
property and satisfying也atthe Pareto boundary of Wo isgiven by 
a graph of a strictly decreas1昭 contmuousfunction h on [O, x汁，
where x1° 話1,and h (x丹＝0.If n> 1,h may not be C' because of b) 
of Assumption 1 
Theorem 2 
Suppose that g satisfies the above properties. Then there 1s 
(x1*, x，＊）εW such白ath (1一喝x1*)=x,*,and (l-O)x,*=h(x1*). 
Proof 
This is a straightforward consequence of the discussion in Chapter 
7 of van Damme (1987). For any given O'E (0,1), define: 
α：［O, X1°］→ R 
such that 
α（x1)=(l一喝h((l 0) Xt）ー h(x】）
Then a(O）く0and a(x丹＞ 0. Since αis continuous, there is xi* 
such白ata(x1*) = 0.(x1へh((1-0) x1*) has the desired property. 
Remark: It is pointed out in Chapter 7 of van Damme (1987）白at
when O' go田 to0, (x1*, X2勺 approachesto a Nash solution. If the 
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limit pomt 1s not the intersection of some g, and g,., then it 1s an 
extended Nash solut10n 
Bibliography 
Abraham, R. & J. Robbin, 1967, 71沼市問問。lMaρings and Flows(W A. 
Ben1amin, New York）ー
Damme, E. van, 1987, Stability and Peゲectfon of Nash Eqnilib円G
(Spnnger, Berlin). 
Hirsch, M. W., 1976, Differential Topology (Springer, New York) 
lntriligator, M., 1971, Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theoη 
(Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. ]. ). 
Nash, ]. F , 1950，“The Bargaining Problem”， Econometrica 18, 155 162 
Nash, ]. F., 1953，“Two Person Cooperative Games”， Econo間 etrica21, 128-
140. 
Rubinstein, A., 1982，“Perfect Eq mlibrium in a Bar宮aining Model”， 
Economet口・，a50, 97-109 
Smale, S., 1974a，“Global Analysis IV'’， ］onrnal of Mathemat1catEconamics 
1, 119 127. 
Smale, S., 197 4b，“Global Analysis V”， journal of Mathemat1calEconomics 
1, 213-221. 
Suzuki, T, 1987, General Equilibrium When So拙 eFirms Follow The Full 
Cost Principle (Ph. D. Thesis, Unive四ityof New South Wales). 
The N "h Bacgammg Model 127 
ナッシュ交渉モデルの補完に関して：第1部
〈要約〉
鈴木時男
本稿においては交渉の数理モデルにおける均衡概念をめぐる問題が提
出され， Nash(l953）そしてその拡張としてのRubinstein(1982）が考察の
対象となっている。
第1節て”は利得集合がSmale(l974a）に基づいていくつかの粂件を満た
す関数で定義される。そしてこのような関数全体の開かつ調密な部分集
合のすべての要素の下で一般化されたナッシュ解が有限個となる事が示
される。この結果は Abraham& Robbin (1967）における無限次元の
transversality theoremに基礎を置いている。
第2節ではRubinsteinmodelの概要が示され， subgameperfectな解
の存在が第1節での一般的な手Ij得集合を用いて証明される。より詳しい
議論は稿を改めて行なう予定である。
